# \section{Introduction}

### Intro/LR

### Theory

The preferences of domestic groups may also determine whether states ultimately comply with agreements once they have been signed.

Leaders may be unable to convince domestic audiences that a particular agreement is beneficial and may therefore be unable to implement agreements after the fact.

% Note: Consistent with this, \citet{simmons2002} found that states with higher levels of judicial independence are more likely to comply with settlements reached as the result of international arbitration or adjudication. This suggests that domestic populations in countries with strong rule of law may be more willing to accept the decisions of international legal bodies, even if they disagree with them.

Most directly, domestic actors will be unlikely to ratify agreements when they disagree on the consequences that

* Opportunity costs
* Repeated interactions
  + By increasing trust, repeated interactions between claimants also facilitates the development of institutions that can be used to monitor and enforce the terms of an agreement.

# \section{Domestic Politics and Adherence to International Agreements}

Although leaders consider a host of domestic and international factors when negotiating international agreements, whether or not an agreement can be feasibly implemented depends on whether domestic audiences support the agreement. Although leaders are unlikely to sign agreements that they do not intend to implement due to the high domestic and international costs of reneging \citep[e.g., ][]{schelling1960, toft2003, zacher2001}, this does not ultimately guarantee that domestic audiences will end up supporting an agreement, for several reasons. First, leaders do not have perfect information about the preferences of their constituents. Leaders may overestimate the incentive to compromise or fail to anticipate the extent to which agreements will mobilize opposition. Second, leaders may also fail to anticipate the extent to which an agreement will mobilize opposition. Third, Shifts in preferences over time.

% additional cites on cost of reneging: crescenzi2003, morrow2000, simmons2000

% Renegotiation – putnam1988, mattes2008, fearon1998, go back to methods chapter

## Compliance

Although ratification of an agreement is necessary for its ultimate success, it by no means guarantees that it will prevail in the long term. One key factor in determining whether an agreement is self-enforcing is whether domestic audiences support its implementation over the long term \citep{fearon1998}. If the expected benefits of an agreement fail to materialize, domestic audiences may prefer that leaders attempt to renegotiate the terms of an agreement or else abrogate that agreement entirely \citep{fearon1998, putnam1988}. Moreover, if leaders do not cave to constituent pressure, they may be removed from office and replaced by a leader who is willing to adhere to those demands. In addition, if agreements are broadly unpopular with members of the selectorate, challengers may use this discontent to mobilize opposition to the current leadership and elicit a change in winning coalition \citep[e.g., ][]{colaresi2005, fearon1998, vasquez2009}.

% Redundant: One circumstance that can lead states to attempt to renegotiate agreements is a change in the preferences of domestic supporters. This may occur due to changes in the winning coalition or leaders in power. As noted in the previous chapter, if members of the winning coalition oppose an agreement, it may lead them to replace a leader with one who is willing to adhere to their preferences. Moreover, if an agreement is unpopular with influential elites or voters, this may provide opposition leaders with the chance to mobilize additional opposition and engineer a change in the winning coalition. If this occurs, the new winning coalition would be able to abrogate an agreement \citep[e.g., ][]{colaresi2005, vasquez2009}.

States may also de facto renege on an agreement due to principal-agent problems. The implementation of an agreement is often dependent on actors such as bureaucracies or the military. Even if an agreement enters into force legally, these actors may have the power to hinder their effective implementation \citep{putnam1988}. The implementation of policies may also be reliant on the explicit or implicit of cooperation of interest groups (e.g., traders) that are influenced by the policy.

% Compliance requires that states continue to view an agreements as preferable to nonagreement

% changes in preferences

% Changes in expected costs of conflict

# \section{Determinants of Domestic Support}

Whether domestic actors support an agreement is dependent on two factors: whether actors support the terms of the agreement and whether they trust their opponent to adhere to the agreement.

## Incentives

First, domestic constituencies must believe that the benefits of implementing an agreement outweigh the costs. If leaders choose to pursue

* Composition of coalition
* Preferences
* Domestic institutions

Interest groups affected by the policy most are particularly important for ratification

* Separation of powers
* Lobbying
* Important actors
* Discipline w/in governing party
* Autonomy of central decision-makers

% The more society benefits, the more segments of society benefit, the harder it is to break the bargaining range

## Commitment Problems

Second, domestic constituencies must believe that their opponent will adhere to the terms of an agreement.

## Additional Considerations

* Mobilization
* Feedback Loops
  + Opportunity costs of claims lead to settlement
  + Settlement leads to increased trade
  + Increase in trade creates feedback effects
    - Development in Contested Regions
    - Joint Development Projects
    - Development of Institutions
  + Trade leads to treaties \citep{espey2004}
  + Threatent – espey and towfique, stinnett2009, gartzke et al 2001
* Iteration

First, leaders who settle claims with important economic partners should be less likely to be punished by domestic audiences. As noted above, economic

# \section{Trade and Domestic Support for Ratification and Compliance}

Although the previous chapter demonstrated that interdependent states are more likely to sign agreements, it cannot be taken for granted that they will be ratified and implemented afterwards.

[Agreement =/= Implementation]

* Mobilization

Previous research has found that trade is associated with cooperation over river claims. States that trade more are more likely to sign treaties governing river claims \citep{dinar2011, espey2004, tir2009}.\footnote{\citet{dinar2011} find that very high levels of trade may decrease the probability of agreement by creating tensions between states \citep[see also][]{barbieri2002}. \citet{stinnett2009} find that, when states sign river treaties, highly interdependent states are more likely to establish formal international institutions as part of the agreement.

However, much of this research does not focus on whether states involved in river claims are more likely to sign agreements. Instead, it focuses purely on whether states sign treaties, which do not necessarily take place in the context of conflictual interactions. Even states that do not have grievances with each other have incentives to coordinate over the development and management of rivers in order to facilitate navigation, reduce pollution, and ensure that states receive enough water.

Don’t examine in the context of issue claims – mostly looking at treaty formation

Dinar and Dinar (2005) argue that a record of trade between states indicate a history of cooperation that may lower the threshold to enter into negotiations and eventually sign treaties.- brochmann and hensel

Due to improvements in states’ abilities to communicate with one another and demonstrate resolve when they are economically interdependent, overcoming the sanctioning problem in multilateral cooperation should be easier. zw2011

Economics creates repeated interactions that make cooperation easier, brings greater benefits, and is less politically controversial – tir2009

Conflict de vries 1990, emphasize the particular elements of an inter-state trade regime thatbode well for a beneficial relationship among states (Gasiorowski 1986)

## \subsection{Incentives for Cooperation}

### Opportunity Costs

Interdependence increases domestic support for the ratification and implementation of agreements both by increasing the expected utility of adhering to agreements and by resolving commitment problems that may prevent domestic actors from supporting an agreement. With respect to expected utility, trade provides domestic actors with incentives to support the implementation of an agreement by increasing the benefits of doing so. As argued in the previous chapter, economic actors who engage in high levels of trade stand to lose if military or diplomatic conflict emerges between the two disputants. Moreover, economic actors that forego trade with the opposing state due to the potential for losses stand to benefit from resolving the claim and thereby creating the potential to expand their operations. By increasing the incentives for these actors to support the ratification and implementation, interdependence expands the win-set or range of agreements that are acceptable domestic actors. Doing so increase the likelihood that the agreements leaders secure will satisfy the demands of these actors.

% Note that this strategy works not by changing the preferences of any domestic constituents, but rather by creating a policy option (such as faster export growth) that was previously beyond domestic control…. For example, ‘in the Tokyo Round. nations used negotiation to achieve internal reform in situations where constituency pressures would otherwise prevent action without the pressure (and tradeoff benefits) that an external partner could provide.'58 Economic interdependence multiplies the opportunities for altering domestic coalitions (and thus policy outcomes) by expanding the set of feasible alternatives in this way-in effect, creating political entanglements across national boundaries. Thus, we should expect synergistic linkage(which is, by definition, explicable only in terms of two-level analysis) to become more frequent as interdependence grows. Putnam 447-448

lower transaction costs by facilitating the use of issue linkages and side-payments – Gartzke 2001

### Cooperation on Other Issues

Institutions increase incentives for cooperation

Hence, river treaties can create positive-sum situations in which the incentives for cooperation become palpable (Bienvenisti, 1996; Waterbury, 2002) \_ even in the face of problematic relationships (e.g. the recent Indus River treaty).

## \subsection{Commitment Problems}

### Costs of defection

Trade also helps alleviate commitment problems in four ways. First, because domestic actors stand to benefit more from an agreement with important economic partners, interdependence increases the costs of defecting from an agreement. In doing so, domestic audiences in one state have less reason to fear defection by the other state and therefore should assign a higher expected utility to adhering to the agreement.

### Repeated Interactions

Second, trade facilitates repeated interactions between states which may then foster cooperation on other issues \citep{lerner1956, rosecrance1986, russet1963}. Repeated interactions between states help establish trust between states by creating channels of communication, creating more predictable relationships, and reducing the costs of cooperation \citep{axelrod1984, blum2007, gartzke2001, keohane2001, kydd2001, mcmillan1997, moravcsik1997, russett2001}. In doing so, cooperation on some issues (in this case, trade) can lay the groundwork for cooperation over other issues. As \citet{blum2007} notes, managing issues that are ``not explicitly tied to resolution may also allow the parties to build trust, understanding, and consideration, without fearing that this more benign approach necessarily be perceived by their rival (or by hard-line domestic constituencies) as a willingness to make more concessions on the core contested issues’’ (p. 249).

### Contact Theory

Third, bilateral trade leads to increased interactions between individuals from each country. Exposure to other groups facilitates the spread of ideas across groups and leads to the formation of personal connections with members of the other country. Increased mobility can also lead to migration between countries, creating familial ties within each and bringing foreigners into contact even with individuals who do not engage in trade with the other state. These positive contacts between individuals can help reduce intergroup hostility and prejudice and promote social trust \citep{pettigrew2008}. In doing so, these interactions can allay fears of defection by the other side and prevent or undo the formation of hostile images of the enemy that contribute to commitment problems \citep{vasquez2009}. % TODO – Vasquez cite

### Institutions

Fourth, building trust between the disputants increases the prospects that agreements include stronger monitoring, enforcement, and conflict resolution mechanisms \citep{elhance2000, espey2004, stinnett2009, tir2009, tir2011, verghese1993}. Because these institutions require delegating some degree of sovereignty over a state’s actions with respect to an issue claim, states will generally be wary of agreeing to enforcement actions. As \citet{stinnett2009} note, ``when states trust each other they will be more willing to accept the sovereignty costs that come from delegating authority to international institutions, ‘’ (p. 240). These institutions reduce uncertainty and increase the costs of defection, helping eliminate commitment problems.

## \subsection{Hypotheses}

* Ratification
* Compliance
* Claim Duration

Less likely to evict leaders, less likely to instigate coalition change, and more likely to endure

Beyond simply eliciting compliance with agreements (including partial agreements), I expect that states should have a easier time putting a claim to rest.

Speaks to compliance with agreements, it does not speak to overall claim resolution

# \section{Analysis – Ratification and Compliance}

To

# \section{Analysis – Claim Duration}